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Abstract—Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) networks have emerged as a 
new communication paradigm between Electric Vehicles (EVs) 
and the Smart Grid (SG). In order to ensure seamless 
communications between mobile EVs and the electric vehicle 
supply equipment, the support of ubiquitous and transparent 
mobile IP communications is essential in V2G networks. However, 
enabling mobile IP communications raises real concerns about the 
possibility of tracking the locations of connected EVs through 
their mobile IP addresses. In this paper, we employ certificate-less 
public key cryptography in synergy with the restrictive partially 
blind signature technique to construct a secure and privacy-aware 
proxy mobile IPv6 (SP-PMIPv6) protocol for V2G networks. SP-
PMIPv6 achieves low authentication latency while protecting the 
identity and location privacy of the mobile EV. We evaluate the 
SP-PMIPv6 protocol in terms of its authentication overhead and 
the information-theoretic uncertainty derived by the mutual 
information metric to show the high level of achieved anonymity.  
Keywords—Electric Vehicles (EV); Privacy-aware; Proxy 
Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6); Security; Smart Grids (SG); V2G Networks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Transportation electrification is one of the major Smart Grid 
(SG)-related applications aiming at achieving sustainable 
transportation systems. This has stimulated the development of 
electric transportation technologies such as Electric Vehicles 
(EVs). With the projected massive number of EVs, anticipated 
to reach up to 10 million on US roads by 2025 [1], intelligent 
management of EVs charging loads is a vital capability for the 
SG to prevent overloads at local sub-stations. From the EV 
users’ perspective, the electric vehicle supply equipment 
(EVSE) (i.e. charging spots) should be widely available and easy 
to reach. Therefore, a variety of residential and public charging 
spots with different charging capabilities should be available for 
EVs to use in Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) networks. 
The current standardisation activities ISO/IEC 15118 [2] and 
SAE J2836 [3] specify the communication interface between 
EVs and EVSEs in V2G networks. According to the ISO/IEC 
15118-2 standard, the IPv6 protocol is mandatory to acquire an 
IP address at the network layer and carry out TCP/IP 
communications to exchange information during the charging 
process and for value added services [2, 4]. Given the fact that a 
full EV charge could be initiated at different geographical 
locations, the SG operator or the mobility operator should be 
able to keep track of a mobile EV and route it to a suitable 
charging spot. Therefore, it is quite critical to maintain seamless 
communications between EVs and EVSE. EVs can use different 
access technologies in V2G networks such as Power Line 
Communications (PLC), WLAN and LTE [5]. Hence, they can 
communicate with the charging infrastructure in different 
contexts to 1) initiate the charging session; 2) negotiate and 
access the information required for the next 
charging/discharging schedule; and 3) terminate the charging 
session and receive the billing information.  
Although the support of ubiquitous and transparent mobile 
IP communications is essential in V2G networks, once a two-
way communication between an EV and EVSE is established, 
there is no technical limitation to the amount and type of data 
that could be obtained from the EV. Such data includes the EV’s 
GPS location, the number of kms indicated on its odometer, as 
well as driver-oriented personal data such as the length of time 
the EV air conditioning was on [6]. In fact, exposing EV users’ 
privacy and tracking and/or profiling them is very easy using 
their mobile IP addresses. 
A handful of studies have addressed anonymous and 
privacy-preserving communications in V2G networks after 
establishing an IP connection [7-9]. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no previous work has addressed the security and 
privacy concerns of mobile IP in V2G networks in order to 
prevent tracking/profiling of EVs using their mobile IP 
addresses. In [10], Nguyen et al. have suggested the Proxy 
Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) protocol for V2G networks. PMIPv6 is 
a network-based localised mobility management protocol that 
can support the mobility of an EV without its involvement [11], 
and allows the EV to use the same IPv6 address while moving 
within a PMIPv6 domain. Moreover, there is no need to modify 
the EV protocol stack to enable it to join a PMIPv6 network.  
While PMIPv6 makes a good candidate for V2G networks, 
it suffers from many security and privacy threats such as 
impersonation, man in the middle, and location tracking attacks. 
Moreover, it has relatively long authentication latency as 
explained later in Section II-A. To rectify the above problems, 
in this paper, a secure and privacy-aware PMIPv6 (SP-PMIPv6) 
protocol for V2G networks is proposed. Thus, the focus of this 
work is the security and privacy issues related to mobile IP at 
the network layer and how they could be addressed. Employing 
the certificate-less public key cryptography in synergy with the 
restrictive partially blind signature (RPBS) technique, this paper 
makes two novel contributions: 1) The SP-PMIPv6 protocol 
reduces significantly the authentication overhead in the standard 
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PMIPv6 by introducing the pass authentication, which 
guarantees a seamless handover with minimum authentication 
delay; 2) SP-PMIPv6 provides a strong location privacy for the 
EV against attempts to track its location in the PMIPv6 domain.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II 
states the preliminaries employed in SP-PMIPv6 protocol. 
Section III describes the V2G network scenario and the security 
goals. Section IV introduces the proposed SP-PMIPv6 protocol. 
Section V provides an analysis and evaluation of the SP-PMIPv6 
protocol. Section VI highlights the benefits of the proposed 
scheme through a brief comparison with related work. Finally, 
Section VII concludes the paper and discusses future work. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
A. PMIPv6 Protocol Operations in V2G Networks 
The PMIPv6 handles the EV mobility within a PMIPv6 local 
mobility domain (LMD) through the following network entities: 
1) A Local Mobility Anchor (LMA), which maintains binding 
cache entries for tracking the locations of the EVs in its domain 
and directing traffic intended for them towards their current 
location; 2) The Mobile Access Gateways (MAGs) responsible 
for performing the mobility signalling with LMA on behalf of 
EVs; and 3) The Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting 
(AAA) Server responsible for authenticating EVs and 
authorising them to access the LMD [11]. Fig. 1 shows the 
PMIPv6 signalling flow. 
 
Fig. 1. PMIPv6 Signalling Flow 
When an EV joins a PMIPv6 LMD, it sends a Router 
Solicitation (RS) message to attach to a MAG, denoted as 
MAG1 in Fig. 1. MAG1 identifies the EV by using its identifier 
EV_ID included in the RS message and requests authentication 
by the AAA server. If successful, MAG1 sends a Proxy Binding 
Update (PBU) message to the LMA that contains EV_ID. The 
LMA updates its binding cache entries and sends a Proxy 
Binding Acknowledgment (PBA) to MAG1 that contains the 
Home Network Prefix (HNP), and subsequently establishes a 
bidirectional tunnel to MAG1. Finally, MAG1 sends a Router 
Advertisement (RA) message to the EV that contains the HNP. 
Upon receiving the RA message, the EV configures its IPv6 
address to communicate with the corresponding node (CN). 
When the EV performs a handover from MAG1 to MAG2, 
MAG1 and the LMA exchange De-PBU and De-PBA messages 
to update the LMA’s binding entries. Then MAG2 authenticates 
the EV again, as explained earlier, and updates EV’s current 
location at the LMA. Finally, it obtains the HNP for the EV. 
Hence, the EV can continue using the same IPv6 address as long 
as it is moving within the same LMD. 
B. Certificate-less Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC) 
Let (𝔾1, +) and (𝔾2, ∙) be two cyclic groups of prime order q, 
and e : 𝔾1 ×  𝔾1 → 𝔾2 be a bilinear pairing that is a map where 
e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab for all P, Q ∈ 𝔾1 and a, b ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗ . A trusted 
Key Generation Centre (KGC) chooses three random generators 
P, P0, P1 ∈ 𝔾1, three secure hash functions H0: {0, 1}* → 𝔾1, H1: 
{0, 1}* → ℤ𝑞
∗ , and H2: 𝔾1
4
 × 𝔾2
4 → ℤ𝑞
∗
 and a random master key 
s ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗ . The KGC then sets Ppub = sP as its public key and 
publishes the system parameters (𝔾1, 𝔾2, e, q, Ppub, P, P0, P1, H0, 
H1, H2, Enc( ∙ )) where Enc( ∙ ) is a symmetric encryption 
algorithm [12]. 
Each legitimate entity A in the system with an identity IDA, 
including EVs, MAGs, the LMA, and the AAA server, sends a 
request to the KGC that includes its IDA and a secret key KA to 
obtain its partial private key. This request is encrypted using 
Ppub. On receipt of this request, the KGC generates a partial 
private key DA = s × QA where QA = H0(IDA), encrypts it using 
KA, and sends it back to A. Upon receipt of the encrypted DA, A 
decrypts it with KA and selects a random number xA ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗  used 
in computing its private key as SKA = xADA and its public key as 
PKA = (XA, YA) where XA = xAP and YA = xAPpub. Finally, we 
define g = e(P, QA) and y = e(YA, QA) to be used later in the RPBS 
technique. It is noted that in CL-PKC, A is not dependant on a 
valid certificate from a trusted authority. Moreover, the KGC is 
not aware of the private key of A.  
C. Restrictive Partially Blind Signature (RPBS) 
The blind signature scheme aims to enable a requester to 
obtain a signature on a message M without revealing anything 
about M to the signer [13]. The restrictive blind signature 
technique was introduced in [14] to allow a requester to obtain 
a signature on M not known to the signer. However, the choice 
of M is restricted and must conform to specific rules. The partial 
blind signature (PBS) technique was introduced in [15] to allow 
the signer to produce a signature on M where the signature 
contains common agreed information that stays clearly visible 
despite the blinding process. The RPBS technique was 
introduced as a PBS that also satisfies the property of 
restrictiveness. In this paper, the Certificate-less RPBS (CL-
RPBS) scheme is adopted, which was introduced in [16]. 
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
A. V2G Network Model & Assumptions 
The V2G network model considered in this paper is 
illustrated in Fig. 2. EV1 is mobile and connects to EVSE and 
the charging infrastructure at different places using different 
access technologies. A vertical handover will occur when 
necessary to allow EV1 to continue its connection. The MAGs, 
the LMA, and the AAA server will be managed either by the SG 
operator or by the mobility operator that handles the 
communications in the SG, the EVSE could be managed by a 
third party such as an EV manufacturer. As shown in Fig. 2, the 
LMA keeps track of the location of EV1 and directs the data 
traffic to the corresponding MAG. MAGs do not maintain 
binding cache entries for the mobile EVs. The CN in Fig. 2 could 
be any entity in the SG charging infrastructure such as the 
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central aggregator (CAG), charging and billing server, etc. In 
order to maintain session continuity and preserve the service 
context between EV1 and the CN, EV1 should maintain the 
same IPv6 address while moving. 
 
Fig. 2. PMIPv6-enabled Vehicle-to-Grid Network 
In this paper, we assume that the PMIPv6-enabled V2G 
network (i.e. the LMD) serves a city or a state, which represents 
a localised SG. Thus, when EV1 acquires an IPv6 address, it can 
retain this address as long as it is moving within the LMD. Inter-
domain handover between different LMDs is outside the scope 
of this paper and left for future work. It is assumed that EV1 is 
equipped with a logical interface to hide the different access 
technologies from the IPv6 stack to retain the same IPv6 address 
after a handover [17].  
B. Security Model 
The communication between the LMA and the MAG is 
protected using IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) in 
transport mode with mandatory integrity protection [11]. The 
KGC is trusted by all entities in the network. There is no trust 
relationship between the EV and the MAGs or the LMA. It is 
assumed that a pre-shared key (PSK) is distributed to all 
legitimate EVs in the LMD and to the AAA server in a secure 
way. The KGC publishes a list of the available MAGs and the 
AAA server in the LMD together with their corresponding 
public keys. Finally, it is assumed that MAGs cannot be 
compromised. 
C. Security & Performance Requirements 
In order to protect the EV’s privacy and prevent its location 
being tracked through its mobile IP address, the following 
security and performance requirements are imposed. 
1) Mutual authentication between the EV and the MAG to 
prevent impersonation attacks and unauthorised access to 
the PMIPv6 domain. 
2) Identity and location privacy for all mobile EVs. No entity 
in the network including the LMA, the AAA server, and 
the MAGs should be able to track the location of the EV 
using its acquired mobile IPv6 address. For instance, in the 
scenario of Fig. 2, the LMA is able to track the identity and 
the location of the connected EV, which should be 
prevented.   
3) Low authentication latency during handover to ensure 
seamless communications between the EV and SG. As can 
be seen in Fig. 1, the AAA server is utilised to authenticate 
an EV every time it joins the LMD or performs a handover 
between two MAGs. 
IV. THE PROPOSED SP-PMIPV6 PROTOCOL 
A. Pass Generation  
Each EV that wants to join the LMD has to register its 
identity with the AAA server and request an anonymous pass. 
This pass is only used to access the PMIPv6-enabled V2G 
network whereas the aspects of billing and rewarding related to 
the charging and discharging processes are handled after 
establishing the IP connection. The AAA server generates the 
pass using a message M from the EV, which is unknown to the 
AAA server, and sets an expiration time  to indicate when the 
pass expires, which stays visible in the pass. We suggest  is 24 
hours. It is assumed that the AAA server will not keep track of 
the passes generated for a particular EV. The pass is used by an 
EV to authenticate itself to a MAG every time it performs a 
handover and when it joins the LMD for which the pass is 
issued. The CL-RPBS technique ensures that the MAG cannot 
establish the real identity of an EV when it sees its pass. The 
steps taken to generate a pass for an EV denoted as EV1 are 
described as follows: 
1) EV1 generates a message M = uAP0 + P1 where uA ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗  is 
a random number kept secret at EV1. It then sends the 
following request to the AAA server EncPSK(IDEV1, M, t1, 
SignEV1(H1(IDEV1 || M || t1))), where t1 is the current 
timestamp and SignEV1 is the digital signature of EV1.  
2) Recall that PSK is a pre-shared key that EV1, as a 
legitimate network entity, shares with the AAA server to 
secure its request. Having validated the request, the AAA 
server chooses randomly r ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗  and J ∈ 𝔾1, calculates U = 
rP, a = e(P, J), b = e(M, J), z = e(M, DAAA) and a pair-wise 
key k1 = e(DAAA, QEV1) and sends EncPSK(U, a, b, z, t2, 
HMACk1(U || a || b || z || t2)) back to EV1. Here HMAC(∙) is 
the message authentication code. The AAA server stores 
the following tuple {IDEV1, M} in its records. 
3) Upon message reception, EV1 calculates k1 = e(DEV1, QAAA) 
and authenticates the message using HMAC( ∙ ). If the 
message is valid, EV1 chooses randomly (α, , u, v, δ, ) 
∈ ℤ𝑞
∗6, and calculates M = M + P, A = e(M, QAAA), z = 
zy, a = augv, b = aubuAv, U = δQAAA + U + P, c = 
H2(M, U, A, z, a, b) + δH1(), c = cu, and sends 
EncPSK(c, t3, HMACk1(c || t3)) to the AAA server.  
4) The AAA server checks the message integrity and if it is 
confirmed, calculates S1 = J + cSKAAA and S2 = cDAAA + 
rH1()Ppub. It sends EncPSK(S1, S2, t4, HMACk1(S1 || S2 || t4)) 
to EV1.  
5) Finally, EV1 checks if the following equations hold: e(P, 
S1) = ay
c
 and e(M, S1) = bz
c
. If yes, it calculates S1 = uS1 + 
vQAAA and S2 = S2 + H1()Ppub. The restrictive partially 
blind signature on M and  is (U, z, c, S1, S2) and the 
passEV1 is {(M, ), (U, z, c, S1, S2)}. 
B. Initial Mobility Session 
When EV1 attaches to MAG1, it generates a pseudo identity 
PID1 as follows PID1 = rAH0(IPEV1) where rA ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗  is a random 
number that is generated every time EV1 attaches to a new MAG 
and IPEV1 is the current obtained IPv6 address of EV1. If IPEV1 
is not available, then it will be taken to be all zeroes. Thus, EV1 
generates a new PID each time it attaches to a new MAG. 
Subsequently, EV1 sends PKE(PKMAG1, {PID1, passEV1, t5, 
H0(PID1 || passEV1 || t5)}) within the RS message to MAG1, 
where PKE(∙) is a public key encryption function and PKMAG1 is 
MAG1’s public key. 
When MAG1 receives the RS message, it verifies the 
passEV1, if it has not expired, as follows. It computes A = e(M, 
QAAA), a = e(P, S1)y-
c and b = e(M, S1)z -
c. If the following 
equation holds e(S2, P) = e(H1()U + H2(M, U, A, z, a, b 
)QAAA, Ppub), then the passEV1 is verified and EV1 is authorised 
to join the LMD. If this is the case, MAG1 sends a PBU message 
to the LMA that contains PID1. The LMA creates a new binding 
entry for PID1 and sends back a PBA message to MAG1. 
MAG1 then sends EncPID1(HNP, t6, H0(HNP || t6)) within the RA 
message to EV1, which validates the received message and 
configures its IPv6 address as illustrated in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. SP-PMIPv6 Signalling Flow 
C. Mobility Session Handover 
When EV1 moves to a new location and detaches from 
MAG1 to attach to MAG2, the authentication process is 
performed as described above but with a new PID2. In SP-
PMIPv6, we propose to delay the transmission of the De-PBU 
and De-PBA messages, shown in Fig. 3, from MAG1 to the 
LMA by a random value d. The reason is to avoid the possible 
linkage of the pseudo identities PID1 and PID2 of EV1 at the 
LMA. Otherwise, the LMA will be able to link the deregistered 
PID1 with the newly registered PID2. Thus, within d, the LMA 
maintains two entries with different PIDs for the same vehicle 
EV1. However, to the LMA, it appears they are the identities of 
two different EVs.  
It is worth noting that within d, the data packets sent to EV1 
will be directed to MAG1 and MAG2 while EV1 is only 
attached to MAG2, thus causing extra resource consumption. 
However, d can be assigned a very small value. With a large 
number of EVs joining and leaving the network, the LMA would 
not be able to link two pseudo identities to the same EV as 
discussed later in Section V-A. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS & PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Security & Privacy Analysis  
This section provides an analysis of the security and privacy 
properties of the proposed SP-PMIPv6 protocol in order to 
determine whether or not it satisfies the security and 
performance requirements specified in Section III-C. 
Identity and Location Privacy. In order to illustrate this 
property, the following questions are answered: 
 Can the AAA server track the locations of an EV? The 
AAA server does not save the generated pass. Thus, it is 
not aware of when and where the EV will use this pass.  
 Can the MAG reveal the identity of an EV? Due to the 
utilisation of the CL-RPBS technique, the MAG cannot 
establish the real identity of EV when it sees its pass even 
with help from the AAA server, which holds the real 
identity of EV and M.  
 Can external adversaries track an EV or reveal its identity? 
All the authentication messages of the SP-PMIPv6 
protocol are encrypted. Thus, the utilised pass cannot be 
disclosed to external adversaries to allow them to track the 
location of an EV if it is assumed that the MAGs cannot be 
compromised internally, which was assumed earlier.  
 Can the LMA track the locations of an EV? The real 
identity of an EV is hidden and PIDs are utilised instead. 
Therefore, the LMA cannot link different PIDs to the same 
EV, so it is unable to track the EV’s locations. 
In the following, the ability of the LMA to link two PIDs 
with a particular EV after performing handover between two 
adjacent MAGs is investigated. For this analysis, it is assumed 
that there are only two MAGs in the network. Assume N is the 
set of all EVs in the binding cache entries table at the LMA and 
W is a subset of N where 1 ≤ |W| ≤ |N|. The EVs in W are attached 
to MAGi and are highly likely to perform a handover to MAGj 
where MAGi and MAGj are geographically adjacent to each 
other. Let us assume that the arrival of new EVs at MAGj follows 
a Poisson arrival process with an arrival rate λ. Let X and Y be 
two discrete random variables with marginal probability 
functions p(x) and p(y), respectively. X represents the 
probability that EV1 with PID1 detaches from MAGi while Y 
represents the probability that EV1 attaches to MAGj with a new 
PID2 right away (i.e. performs a handover).  
It is worth noting that the LMA cannot assign different 
probabilities to the members of W. We utilise the mutual 
information (MI) I(Y; X) metric that measures the amount of 
reduction in uncertainty about Y given the realisation of X. 
Hence, it measures how much knowing that EV1 with PID1 
detaches from MAGi reduces the uncertainty of the LMA that 
EV1 attaches to MAGj with PID2. I(Y; X) is defined as 
I(Y; X) = H(Y) – H(Y | X)     (1) 
where H(Y) measures the amount of information the LMA 
knows about Y and H(Y|X) is the conditional entropy that 
measures the amount of information needed to describe Y given 
that the value of X is known. Using p(x) and p(y) notation, we 
rewrite (1) as follows 
 
y,xy
y,xp
xp
logy,xpyplogypX,YI
)(
)(
)()()()( 22       (2) 
where p(x, y) is the joint probability distribution function of X 
and Y. We define p(x) = 
1
|W|
 as the probability that EV1 detaches 
from MAGi and p(y) = 
1
|W|
∙
1
λt +1
 as the probability that EV1 
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attaches to MAGj after detaching from MAGi. λt is the average 
number of arrivals per t units. Fig. 4 shows the amount of 
reduction in uncertainty about Y with respect to the size of W 
and the mean arrival rate λ when t is set to 1 second. 
 
Fig. 4. Amount of Reduction in Uncertainty 
 It can be observed in Fig. 4 that for the LMA, the amount of 
reduction in uncertainty decreases when both the size of W and 
the arrival rate λ increase. This outcome demonstrates that the 
LMA stays uncertain about whether PID1 and PID2 belong to 
EV1 even though the network has only two MAGs. Therefore, 
SP-PMIPv6 protocol ensures high level of anonymity for mobile 
EVs at the LMA.  
Mutual Authentication. The SP-PMIPV6 protocol achieves 
mutual authentication between an EV and the AAA server and 
between the EV and the MAG to which it is attached. At pass 
generation, the EV sends its IDEV, M, and a signature to the AAA 
server. This information is encrypted with PSK that the EV 
shares with the AAA server. The AAA server authenticates the 
EV via its signature and saves its information. When the EV 
attaches to the MAG, the EV sends its pass with which the MAG 
can authenticate the EV as a legitimate user that is authorised to 
join the LMD. When the MAG replies with the RA message that 
is encrypted using PID1, the EV authenticates the MAG as well. 
Stolen pass attack resistance. As mentioned earlier, the AAA 
server does not save the pass it signed for a particular EV. Thus, 
even if it is compromised, the attacker cannot steal the pass. 
Furthermore, the EV is required to obtain a new pass every 24 
hours. Hence, even if it is stolen, it can only benefit the attacker 
for a limited period. 
B. Performance Evaluation – Authentication Latency  
In this section, the performance of the proposed protocol SP-
PMIPv6 is evaluated in terms of the authentication latency by 
comparing it with that of the PMIPv6 protocol with the 
traditional AAA server architecture shown in Fig. 1.   
The transmission delay between EVs and MAGs as well as 
MAGs and the LMA is taken to be 10 ms, while the transmission 
delay between MAGs and the AAA server is taken to be 160 ms 
according to [18], which is assumed to include the time needed 
to authenticate the EV as well. In SP-PMIPv6, the MAG needs 
to perform five pairing operations and two exponentiation 
operations to verify the pass. The time needed to perform a 
single exponentiation operation is Texp = 1.1 ms and the 
corresponding pairing operation is Tpar = 3.1 ms with pre-
computation on Intel Pentium 4 3.0-GHz machine [19]. Thus, 
the pass verification process takes 17.7 ms. Besides that, there is 
one PKC operation, one Enc( ∙ ) operation, and two hash 
operations H0 as shown in Fig. 3. It is assumed that the time 
needed to perform the Enc(∙) and H0 operations is negligible 
considering the small size of the messages. It is assumed that 
RSA-1024 is utilised for the PKC operation. The RSA-1024 
encryption operation takes 0.03 ms while the decryption takes 
0.6 ms [20]. Thus, the authentication latency is estimated to be 
10 + 0.03 + 0.6 + 17.7 + 10 = 38.33 ms. In the standard PMIPv6 
protocol, the authentication latency is 10 + 160 + 10 = 180 ms. 
Therefore, we can clearly argue that the SP-PMIPv6 protocol 
reduces the authentication latency by 78.7% in comparison to 
the standard PMIPv6 protocol.  
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK 
The security and privacy issues in V2G networks and in 
PMIPv6/Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) networks have been addressed 
separately in the literature. A brief overview of some related 
works follows.  
Jie et al. [9] proposed a secure and efficient authentication 
scheme with privacy preserving for V2G networks. The scheme 
allows the EVSE to authenticate EVs anonymously and manage 
them dynamically. The authentication scheme is based on a 
revocable group signature, a vector commitment scheme, and an 
ID-based RPBS technique. Each entity in the system acquires a 
pair of public/private keys from a trusted authority (TA). The 
CAG then assigns a permit to each eligible EV that allows it to 
connect to the SG. After verifying the permit, the local 
aggregator (LAG) generates a group membership certificate for 
the EV, which allows it to join the V2G network. This scheme 
suffers from the key escrow problem inherited from the ID-
based PKC. 
Liu et al. [8] presented a role-dependant privacy-
preservation scheme (ROPS) to achieve secure interaction 
between an EV and the SG. The authors specified three roles in 
which an EV interacts with the SG: energy demand, energy 
storage, and energy supply. In each role, the EV has dissimilar 
security and privacy concerns. Therefore, Liu et al. proposed a 
set of interlinked sub protocols to incorporate different privacy 
considerations when an EV acts as a customer, storage or a 
generator. The proposed sub protocols utilise the ring signature, 
fair blind signature, and proxy re-encryption techniques to 
prevent the LAG from correlating the EV’s real identity with its 
sensitive information. It also depends on a central authority 
(CA) to assign pseudonyms to EVs and LAGs. Considering the 
large number of network entities and pseudonyms the CA has to 
manage, the CA is the bottleneck of this scheme.  
In the context of securing the PMIPv6 protocol, Chaung et 
al. proposed a secure password based authentication mechanism 
for seamless handover in PMIPv6 networks called SPAM [21]. 
The mobile node (MN) registers with the AAA server to receive 
authentication credentials on a smart card. When the MN joins 
the LMD, the user inserts the smart card and then keys in his/her 
identity and a password to get the authentication credentials. 
These credentials are utilised to perform a mutual authentication 
with the MAG. The authors assumed that the smart cards are 
tamper-proof; however, most of them are not as shown in [22]. 
Besides, smart cards are vulnerable to loss and/or theft and 
SPAM is vulnerable to password guessing attacks. 
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Taha and Shen proposed ALPP; an anonymous and location 
privacy-preserving scheme for MIPv6 networks [23]. ALPP 
consists of two sub-schemes: anonymous home binding update 
(AHBU) and anonymous return routability (ARR) to add 
anonymity and location privacy to MIPv6 binding updates and 
return routability control messages, respectively. The authors 
combined onion routing and the anonymiser to encrypt 
repeatedly the transmitted messages at each hop to resist traffic 
analysis attacks and increase the achieved location privacy of 
MNs. The ALPP scheme utilised CL-PKC to authenticate a MN 
to its foreign gateway, which acts as a KGC for an attached MN. 
Although, the utilisation of CL-PKC reduces the computational 
overhead of the certificate management process, onion routing 
is computationally expensive and many studies have shown its 
susceptibility to different entities having some access to large 
fractions of its input-output links [24].  
This paper differs from the above studies in that it identifies 
the security and privacy challenges of applying PMIPv6 in V2G 
networks and proposes a novel solution to address these 
challenges. The utilisation of anonymous credentials for EVs 
while connecting to V2G networks does not address the EVs 
location privacy concerns because they can still be tracked and 
identified through their mobile IP addresses. Therefore, the 
proposed protocol complements the work reported in the 
literature to potentially deliver higher levels of EV’s identity and 
location privacy in V2G networks. 
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, the utilisation of PMIPv6 in V2G networks has 
been investigated and the security and privacy concerns of EVs 
in this context identified. In order to achieve seamless 
communications between an EV and the SG while protecting the 
identity and location privacy of the EV, a secure and privacy-
aware PMIPv6 protocol (SP-PMIPv6) for V2G networks has 
been proposed. SP-PMIPv6 synergistically exploits the CL-
PKC and the RPBS schemes to achieve mutual authentication 
and identity and location privacy. Moreover, it achieves a high 
level of anonymity for EVs by decreasing the amount of 
reduction in uncertainty about the identity of an EV at the LMA 
on handover. Besides, SP-PMIPv6 achieves low authentication 
latency in comparison to the standard PMIPv6. For future work, 
intention is to extend the SP-PMIPv6 protocol to cover inter-
domain handover and assess its performance in a real-time test 
bed based on Software Defined Networking (SDN), which is 
currently under development [25]. 
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